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the same time, the French papers in
commenting on the situation, were
quite strong in stating that France
should not be intimidated by what
they called a "German bluff". This
was a political question and after a
long discussion, it was finally settled
in the Council by the Italian representative, who said he thought France
could have 800 soldiers in the region
if they did not use them. This humorous remark concluded a very serious controversy to the apparent satisfaction of all concerned.
The Assembly is the Parliament of
the Nations, and it never gets beyond
the preparation and discussion of
world affairs. Its matters of importance are usually referred to a commission.

The commissions of the League are
summoned to meet from time to time
to deal with specific problems and Dr.
Shotwell said at this point that there
was not a week in the year during
which some commission was not holding a meeting, discussing some national problem, something unheard of
before the war.
In conclusion, Dr. Shotwell said that
as first planned, the League was only
for the purpose of averting wars, but
that due to the way the League had
functioned, it was going to succeed
because of.the world interest in building up human contacts and a world
community.
B&M.

Martial Law in Colorado
(Address delivered before The Law Club, Jan. 25, 1928,
By Frazer Arnold, of the Denver Bar.)

oppose organized government
RGANIZATIONS
or societies
to
have existed continuously
from
the Middle Ages to the present day.
The first anarchist is said to have
been Zeno the Stoic. He represented
a group of philosophers opposed to
the ideas of the State as elaborated by
Plato.
In 19th and 20th Century despotisms, organizations to oppose government generally, have claimed a large
share of the talent and energy of the
revolutionary movement, especially
among the youth. The cruelties and
stupidities of their government excited
fiery indignation against the only
State with which they were familiar.
It has been characteristic of the Russian and German temperament, especially, that it will work out comprehensive systems of philosophy to harmonize all society and all life with

some rather narrow conclusion. This
is done with a laboriousness and a
plausibility that are amazing. With
the criminality of their own government immutably fixed in mind, they
evolve systems which demonstrate
that the governments of France, the
United States and all other modern
republics are practically as bad as any
other form of the State. They very
early, in any revolution, break with
the Constitutional Democrats, whom
they regard as obstructionists to a
realization of their dreams, and whom
they persecute relentlessly whenever
they get in power. This is the normal
course of all European revolutions:
of the First Revolution in France, the
upheavals on the continent in 1848,
the Paris Commune Interlude of 1871,
and the events in Russia, Austria and
Hungary in 1917, '18 and '19.
The anarchists have had their share
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of geniuses, among them such brilliant
and attractive writers as Bakunin,
Proudhon, and Prince Kropotkin; and
it is not hard to understand their influence upon the young of certain
European countries. In America, however, their proselytes are generally
those of defective education, individuals with a flair for wild theory, victims of academic seclusion, and others
with no knowledge or practical experience in business, administration
or law.
It is needless to say that not every
radical organization is illegal. A perfect right exists to change our system
of government and society by methods
provided in our Constitution, and to
advocate such change by constitutional methods, regardless of the impolicy or folly of the change advocated. We are here dealing only with
radicalism which seeks to enforce its
demands by violence.
Such societies are declared unlawful by Sec. 6655 of our Compiled Laws,
and the next section makes participation in their activities a felony.
A few years ago the danger of extreme radicalism seemed to lie in the
labor unions, but of late years wiser
counsels have prevailed there. Today
the extreme radicals get more comfort in institutions of higher learning,
universities
and theological seminaries.
In an attempt to gauge the problem
in America, for executive purposes,
our Federal Government a few years
ago made surveys of the extreme radical man power in this country, with
the following conclusion:
In extreme radical
organizations .......... 380,000
Radical members of
semi-radical organizations ........................ 322,000
Non-enrolled adherents
of the above groups..200,000
Total of this type-,-- 902,000
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Elements which experience has shown are
likely to join in wherever disturbances occur:
(1) Unorganized aliens 40,000
(2) Unorganized criminals ................................
50,000
(3) Other uncertain
and
hoodlum
elem ents ........................ 50,000
Total of this kind._..
Grand total ......

140,000
1,042,000

Extreme radical groups are, as a
rule, loosely organized, the leaders inefficient and unreliable, and the members undisciplined.
All p6sess or
could easily procure small arms, uch
as rifles, pistols, revolvers, shotguns
and bombs. Very few will be found
in their ranks who have had military
training or experience.
Most of our disturbances are industrial and local, although, as at present,
they usually draw their leadership and
inspiration from the anarchist-communist societies, whose aims are not
local or economic but political and
revolutionary. I do not suppose that
the violent radicals are any more numerous now than in 1920; but that
does not mean that we shall not continue to have violent disturbances
from time to time, for as long a period as any of us shall remain on the
scene.
Eighty years have rolled by since
Karl Marx issued his Communist Manifesto calling upon the workers of the
world to unite and overthrow bourgeois society, yet the proletarian revolution seems as far away in Western
Europe and America as it did then.
Nevertheless our republic is only a
century and a half old, which is nothing, compared with the great empires
of history, and there is no predicting
what may be ahead in the none too
remote future.
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At present the I. W. W. is the most
formidable organization for violent
disturbance, and the Industrial and
economic effects of its activities are
great and baneful. Its leaders have
mapped the country, showing the various so-called "sympathetic areas".
Wherever a state constabulary is nonexistent or hastily organized, or the
local executives are wavering or sympathetic, or the courts are believed to
be equivocal in their doctrines, there
do these goshawks and turkey buzzards of "direct action" wing their
way.
The truth is that in no modern country, except in the Confederate States
during t~eir brief existence, have
there been so many instances of civil
dist~irbance, demanding the executive
remedy of Martial Rule, as in the
United States. And nowhere (that I
know of-) have the legal rules and
principles defining and explaining that
extreme remedy been better or more
clearly stated.
Martial Law is the child of necessity and is not peculiar to any nation
or type of nation. In Continental Europe it is called the state of siege.
It exists and has always existed in
England, although some attempt was
formerly made to disguise it with fictions, and to treat it as an illegal exercise of power, to be followed and
justified by parliamentary acts of indemnity. In this country it has been
invoked at all periods of our history,
and by executives of every school of
opinion. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Tyler, Lincoln, Johnson, Grant, Cleveland, McKinley, Wilson, Coolidge, all found it necessary
to use the remedy, either in strict or
qualified form, during their respective
terms of office, as President or as Governor of a State, or both. Nowhere
has it been oftener or more vigorously
employed than by the central government of the Confederate States during
the Civil War. It has been invoked

continually by governors in the various states and once by a legislature
-that of Rhode Island.
The jurisdiction has been explained
and upheld quite consistently by nearly all state and federal courts, including the federal Supreme Court, and is,
perhaps, more or less clearly understood by most lawyers. It is doubtful,
however, whether a majority of laymen, including many writers, have a
clear conception of what it is all about,
and why, during a period of Martial
Rule, the familiar constitutional guaranties are, in greater or less degree,
suspended. Most citizens approve of
Martial Law, on the vague ground of
necessity, because they have confidence in their government and its
courts; but a certain amount of nonsense is spoken and written on the
subject whenever Martial Rule appears, not only by the insurrectionists
and their sympathizers, who may be
depended upon in that particular, but
likewise by persons who are presumed
to know. Among lawyers the difficulty is not that they do not believe that
the jurisdiction properly exists, but
they are not always clear on the legal
formula which establishes it.
The
maxims, Necessity knows no law;
Inter arma silent leges; salus republicae suprema lex, etc., are not very
convincing, and, like most legal maxims, require explanation to be properly applied.
It will be my attempt in this paper
to make clear some of these vague
conceptions, and to show how the summary methods involved in martial law
are entirely constitutional and just as
legal as any other acts devolving upon
the executive department, with especial reference to the executive of a
state, and of Colorado in particular.
The chief misunderstandings may
be briefly indicated. All state constitutions contain bills of rights similar to those in force in Colorado.
Most of these provisions contain lan-
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guage showing on its face that the
guaranty afforded is qualified and subject to exception in time of insurrection, but I shall first state them as
though their language purported to be
absolute and without exception. Few
of those who denounce the supposed
violation of the sacred guaranties have
ever read the guaranties, and I shall
state them as they are popularly alleged to be, assuming, as I say, that
the Colorado clauses are fairly typical
of other state constitutions.
The courts of justice shall be open
to every person (Art. II, Sec. 6).
No law shall be passed impairing
the freedom of speech; every person
shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject
(Sec. 10).
All persons shall be bailable except
for capital offenses (Sec. 19).
The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall never be suspended (Sec.
21).
The military shall always be in
strict subordination to the civil power
(Sec. 22).
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate (Sec. 23).
The people have the right peaceably
to assemble for the common good.
(Se.c. 24).
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law (Sec. 25).
Now, it is argued, these guaranties
are laid down by the sovereign people
in their constitution, the same fundamental law which creates the office
of governor. The governor is a mere
creature of this constitution. Without
it, he has no official existence. He
has no powers whatsoever except what
that instrument gives him. He cannot override any one of its provisions
without being guilty of usurpation.
Therefore, the guaranties above set
forth being of equal dignity with those
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creating the governor and defining his
powers, not he or any other department of the state can ever abrogate
them. No necessity or emergency, no
matter what, can ever authorize the
governor or any subordinate of his to
disregard the privileges set out in this
bill of rights.
That is the argument.
Before coming to the main answer,
let me call attention to some of the
qualifying phrases I have mentioned,
in the bill of rights itself, which will
serve to make the main answer more
clear and conclusive.
"The courts of justice shall be open
to every person, and", the language
is added, "a speedy remedy afforded
for every injury."
Very good. But suppose the courts
of justice have been closed by a mob,
or, what is the same thing, the forces
of disorder have rendered their process ineffective and their protection
nil. Who will open the courts of justice?
Not the mere declaration of
section 6. It is a thing of paper and
printer's ink. If the courts are to be
opened at all, it must be by some
restorative power outside of the court
itself, and not found anywhere in the
phraseology of Article II.
The next guaranty reads: "That no
law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech."
By its very terms, this guaranty imposes a limitation on the legislative,
not the executive, department. When
the governor and his military subordinates place a ban on inflammatory
speech-making in the insurrectionary
zone, their action is wholly executive
and does not pretend to be legislative.
The habeas corpus clause, in Sec.
21, is very significant, because, just after the words "shall never be suspended", we find the phrase "unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety may require it".
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Section 17, which says that the military shall always be in strict subordination to the civil power is fulfilled
by making the governor its commander-in-chief, placing it under the chief
civil magistrate of the state, for "the
civil power" means the executive department no less than the legislative
or judicial. This section clearly relates to the normal times and places
of civil peace, because in insurrectionary districts there is no civil power,
at least none that is effective, and the
military cannot be in strict subordination to the local "civil power" until
the military itself has restored and
revivified that civil power, whereupon
everyone admits that the role of the
military is over. In civil war, the
military cannot be in strict subordination to something that does not exist,
something which has been overthrown
and which the military is doing its
level best to set upright and enthrone
again, under the command of the chief
civil magistrate the governor.
The right of assembly, like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
was also sadly qualified by the practical empire-builders who framed the
fundamental law of Colorado. They
said: "That the people have the right
peaceably to assemble for the common
good. and to apply to those invested

with the powers of government for
redress of grievances, by petition or
remonstrance".
And, as to the due process of
section, it will presently be seen
the summary methods of martial
are as much due process of law as
other executive process.

law
that
law
any

What then is Martial Law? We may
answer that crudely by saying that it
is the action of the governor in trying,
by means of the instrumentalities given him in the state constitution, to
fulfill the printary function of his oflice, by carrying out Sections 2 and 5
of Article IV.

These provide that the supreme executive power of the state shall be
vested in the governor, who shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed; and that he shall be commander-in-chief of the military forces
of the state, with power to call out
the militia to execute the laws, suppress insurrection or repel invasion.
In his specially concurring opinion
in the Milligan case, Chief Justice
Chase gave the first clear statement, or
rather suggestion, of the three kinds
of military jurisdiction under our
federal Constitution.
His classification has been adopted by practically
all American courts, text writers and
publicists, and forms the basis for the
manuals and studies of the War Department today.
Not in the language of any authority, but in my own phraseology, these
may be briefly indicated as follows:
First we have Military Law, governing persons in the military service
and camp followers. It is found in the
Acts of Congress, Articles of War,
General Orders, and Customs of the
Service. It does not apply to civilians,
either in peace or war; and its characteristic tribunal is the Court-Martial,
General, Special and Summary. It is
part of our domestic or municipal law.
Second is Military Government,
sometimes called the law of hostile occupation. This supersedes, so far as
the commander of the invading forces
deems expedient, the local law in force
before the invasion took place; and
the sanction for that part of the local
law which is allowed to govern is not
the displaced sovereignty of the invaded country, but the will of the military commander of the invader. Examples of this were the military government set up in Mexico by General
Scott in 1847; that of the belligerent
Contederate States when invaded in
the '60s; that enforced, with unnecessary rigor, by the German forces in
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Belgium during the world war; and
that of the occupied zone in Germany
from 1918 to 1920. Its sanction is the
will of the military commander under
the direction (with us) of the President. Its legal foundation is International Law. Its practices and precedents are the customs and usages of
war. Its characteristic tribunals are
the Military Commission and the Provost-Court, superior and inferior.
The third is Martial Law proper. A
more logical descriptive term is Martial Rule. It relates to domestic territory in a condition of insurrection or
invasion, when the Constitution and
its civil authorities have been rendered inoperative and powerless by the
insurrectionary or invading forces. It
is part of our domestic or municipal
law. In Colorado its foundation is
Article IV, Sections 2 and 5. Its characteristic tribunals are the Military
Commission and the Provost Court.
Its practices and precedents are borrowed from International Law, in the
usages and customs of war. Superficially, therefore, it resembles Military Government or hostile occupation.
In the Moyer case, decided in 1905
and reported in 35 Colorado, it was
argued for the petitioner that the governor could not declare Martial Law
or find or proclaim that a condition of
insurrection existed, and that that
power resided solely in the legislature; but the court, in line with the
authorities, held that these were executive functions fundamentally. Exercising the caution required of the
judicial office, they declined to say that
the state of affairs incident to the
overthrow of civil authority in San
Miguel County and the employment of
the troops by the governor to restore
and maintain order could be called
Martial Law, and confined themselves
rigidly to a decision of the case before them under our Constitution and
statutes.
In point of fact, however,
whenever an insurrection is found by

the governor to exist, for the suppression of which he sends a military
force into the field, the resultant legal
status is one of Martial Law in the
district, regardless of whether strict
or mild measures of repression are
put into effect, or whether it is called
Martial Law or something else.
Neither the governor, nor the commander of the troops, nor the proclamation or declaration of either, is
what suspends or abrogates Constitutional guaranties. Those have already
been suspended and abrogated by the
mob or other violent forces in the locality. It is mere mockery to assert
that the Constitution is in force in a
district where a mob and its leaders
hold the life and property of the citizen in the hollow of their hands. The
Constitution does have a theoretical or
potential existence there, but it is, for
the time being, a mere shadow; otherwise the civil authorities would be in
actual control. It is true that the mob
may confine its hostility to some particular class or business like the coal
industry, or to some locally unpopular
race or the devotees of a form of worship of which the mob does not approve.
Other citizens may be unmolested, but it is because the mob
has its attention and fury focused in
another direction. In those cases, the
military commander allows the civil
officers to function in the many duties
which are unobstructed by the riotous
forces; yet, as to that class, race or
industry which the civil authorities'
have shown their impotency to protect,
its constitutional rights have clearly
been torn away from it by the riotous
forces and not by the state executive.
The error into which enthusiasts for
the civil guaranties fall is that they
ignore other articles of the fundamental law, of equal dignity. There
are more things in a constitution than
the Bill of Rights. All constitutional
provisions must be construed together,
and harmonized. A workable govern-
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ment could be established without a
bill of rights, but no government could
be set up upon a bill of rights alone.
As said in the Moyer case, power must
reside somewhere. The primary duty
of a state is self-defense and self-preservation. To the executive is entrusted that duty. In times of tranquillity
people imagine that our civil government is part of the law of nature, but
the men who founded the state knew
that the maintenance and vindication
of its authority might be a serious
thing, and that the state executive is
vested with office for more basic purposes than to sign bills and pardon
criminals. Article IV entrusts to our
governor those great but necessary
powers which were entrusted to the
powerful governors of old time, when
the real role of a governor of a colony
or province was better understood, by
people generally, than it is today.
In addition to the constitutional sections above mentioned, the General Assembly has provided as follows:
Comp. L. 1921, Sec. 218:
"When riots, invasion or insurrection. in the state is made or threatened, the governor shall order the
national guard to repel or repress
the same; Provided that when the
emergency is great and time will not
permit of communication with the
governor, the commanding officer of
any portion of the national guard
stationed at the scene of trouble may
assemble his command and after taking steps to notify the governor in
the most speedy manner possible, aid
the civil authorities in suppressing
riots or insurrection, or repelling invasion".
See. 219:
"When there is in any town, city
or county a tumult, riot, mob or body
of men, acting together by force with
attempt to commit a felony or to
offer violence to persons or property,
or by force and violence to break and
resist the laws of the state, or when
such tumult, riot or mob is threatened and the fact is made to appear to
the governor, he may issue his order,
or such sheriff or mayor may issue
a call directed to any commanding
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officer of any portion of the national
guard within the limits of their jurisdiction, directing him to order his
command to appear at a time and
place designated, to aid the civil
authority to suppress such violence
and to support the law".
The next ensuing sections provide
penalties for disobeying the act, or
failing to respond to such call, provide
for the method of notifying members
of the command, etc.
These sections were enacted in the
session of 1921, and were evidently
prompted by the tramway riots which
occurred in Denver in the summer of
1920.
Section 5495, enacted
vides:

in

1914, pro-

"Whenever in the opinion of the
governor a condition of riot, insurrection or invasion exists in this
state, or in any county or counties,
city or cities, town or towns, district
or districts in this state, he shall
have the right to declare the state
or any such county or counties, etc.,
to be in a state of riot, or insurrection, or invasion, by proclamation,
and to prohibit the purchase, etc .....
of any firearms or ammunition, in
the places covered by such proclamation or in any other portions of the
state designated by him during the
time that said proclamation remains
in force".
These statutes are interesting, and
suggest some questions to which we
shall return in a moment.
We have seen that when constitutional protection is wipea out by insurrection, it becomes the governor's duty
immediately to restore it. This is ordinarily done:
(a) By sending the armed forces of
the state into the field in such numbers as may seem best to subdue the
turbulent elements and protect the citizens and industries of the district;
and
(b)
By simultaneously issuing a
proclamation of Martial Law, defining
the district wherein the governor finds
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that the civil authority has been overthrown, and publishing, for the information of everyone, the measures he
finds needful to enforce while the civil
authority is in process of reestablish.ment.
The first of these is necessary, as
there can be no Martial Law unless a
military force has been called out. The
second is not necessary, although usIf the governor
ual and advisable.
himself issues no proclamation, the
commander of his troops may; or there
may be fragmentary and supplemental
proclamations from either.
In any
event, the will of the governor, and of
the commander of the troops (with the
governor's approval, express or implied) is the law of the district during
the emergency. We have seen that the
practices and precedents to guide the
military forces are borrowed from International Law in the usages and customs of war. This is necessarily true,
because the means to be used, under
the express terms of the constitution,
are the military forces of the state,
and they are trained, equipped, organized and tactically employed as military forces, and not otherwise. The
usages of war, as recognized in International Law, are the only precedents
and standards that exist for the employment of troops. As said by Chief
Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden:
"Unquestionably, a state may use
its military power to put down an
armed insurrection, too strong to be
controlled by the civil authority.
The power is essential to the existence of every government, essential
to the preservation of order and free
institutions, and is as necessary to
the states of this Union as to any
other government ....
It was a state
of war; and the established government resorted to the rights and usages of war to maintain itself, and
to overcome the unlawful opposition".
And in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S.,
the Federal Supreme Court, after referring to the Colorado constitution
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and supplemental statutes, authorizing
the governor to use the national guard
to suppress insurrection, "made or
threatened", says:
"That means that he shall make
the ordinary use of the soldiers to
that end".
Considering, for a moment, the acts
of the General Assembly, quoted above,
it will be apparent that they fall into
two elements; the first being merely
declaratory, so to speak, of the Constitution, and the second actually legislative in effect. I am inclined to
think that every authority purported
to be conferred on the governor by
section 218, already existed under the
constitution, that is, to order out the
national guard to repress any riot or
insurrection made or threatened, or to
authorize, by general or special order,
his ,subordinate commanders in the
National Guard to act promptly in a
local emergency, notifying him as
quickly as possible. Section 219 is
clearly declaratory, except in that part
which authorizes a sheriff or mayor
to issue a call to a local commander,
and making a response thereto obligatory. The latter is, I think, valid,
unless the governor should countermand the call or give other orders to
the local commander. The governor is
the constitutionally appointed commander-in-chief; and the legislature
cannot dictate how he shall employ
his troops. This is not only clear in
principle but established by authority.
Another point is that when the sheriff
or mayor has issued his call, he is
through. A civil officer cannot command or control a military force. That
is for its commander, and he takes
orders from and is responsible to no
one but his superior officers. In suppressing the riot, he uses his troops in
the way he thinks best to accomplish
his mission. Section 5495 is clearly
declaratory.
When insurrection is
flagrant anywhere, the governor can
regulate or prevent, by any method he
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finds necessary, the sale of arms and
ammunition in Denver, Pueblo, or elsewhere.
Nevertheless, it seems that all these
statutes are dictated by good policy,
placing the moral support of the legislature behind any governor who acts
with promptness and energy to restore
civil authority.
It of course results, from the foregoing principles, that the commanding
officer may seize and imprison anyone
whom he has reason to think is contributing to a continuance of the disorder, may direct the activities of the
sheriff or other civil authorities, or
remove them from office, may interdict meetings or the publication or
circulation of inflammatory newspapers and manifestoes, and establish
curfew regulations, etc., for the government of the disturbed area. In the
course of his tactical operations he
may destroy life and property where
necessary; in short, he may resort to
such measures, and the same sort of
measures, as would be proper if the
forces of a foreign government were
invading the district. It is here we
find the proper application of the maxims, "The safety of the republic is the
supreme law. Between armed forces
the laws are silent".
Likewise, the governor or commander may, if deemed necessary, establish
Military Commissions and Provost
Courts, to try offenses against the
rules of Martial Law and crimes and
disorders generally. These tribunals
are really in the nature of executive
committees to advise the commander
as to the truth in cases where the facts
and circumstances require a full and
fair investigation, and are usually
needed only where operations are on
a large scale.
Their findings and
sentences require approval of the convening authority, i. e. the governor or
commander, before they can be executed. The penalties imposed are, for the
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most part, in Martial Law situations,
only temporary measures of safety,
such as imprisonment during the
emergency, until the prisoner can be
tried upon the restoration of civil authority under conditions fair to the
People, expulsion from the district and
the like; but not necessarily so. They
may impose penalties for offenses
against the military regime, like disobedience to orders, breaking regulations, etc., but if the offenses are to
be punished as being against civil laws,
their trial should ordinarily await the
restoration of civil authority. In discussing this question, in the case of
the United States v. Fischer, 280 Fed.
208, arising out of disorders in Nebraska in 1922, Judge Munger said:
"Does the military power in the
occupied territory which is declared
under martial law extend to the trial
and punishment of offenders against
regulations made by the military
commander? Some cases are cited
in support of the proposition that
the military forces can do no more
than to arrest and detain offenders
against the laws of the state until
they can be delivered to the civil authorities for trial, upon the restoration of peace and order. No doubt
the commander may avail himself of
the courts as a means of trial, but
he may also institute tribunals during the emergency to deal with offenders in the district. This is especially true of offenses against the
military regulations, such as these
petitioners committed, acts which
are not offenses against the laws of
the state. . . . Can the sentence of

imprisonment by such a military
tribunal be continued after peace is
declared?
This question has not
been the subject of many reported
decisions. The power to punish serious offenses by imposition of the
death penalty is well understood,
and the lesser punishment of imprisonment for life has been sustained. It is stated that during the
Civil War such military commissions
acting under the authority of the
United States held trials and entered
judgment in more than two thousand cases, and that sentences of imprisonment for terms of years and
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for life were imposed. In cases of
serious offenses it is not doubted
that the sentence of imprisonment
may continue during the war or insurrection. If the punishment is inflicted but a few days before the establishment of peace, it would seem
absurd that sentences, otherwise
just, should at once expire. While
the necessity for crushing further
resistence may have passed, the reason for continuance of sentences
theretofore given has not ceased.
The conclusion is that . . . there is
nothing in the exertion of this power which contravenes the right of
due process of law guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United
States".
Although the governor had theretofore proclaimed the insurrection to be
over, the applications of the prisoners
for their release were denied.
Military Commissions resemble
Courts-Martial in organization and appearance and are composed of as many
officers as the tactical situation permits, not usually exceeding thirteen.
A commission of less than three would
be contrary to precedent. A judge advocate and defense counsel are provided for, and trials proceed, so far as
possible, on the principles of General
Courts-Martial.
Provost courts are
one-man tribunals, to handle more or
less petty offenses.
No case involving martial-law courts
has yet arisen in Colorado. They are
merely a detail, however, in the exercise of the admitted powers of the
commander, and are not affected by
the constitutional provisions as to bail,
jury trial, etc. A sentence under them
does not make the prisoner a convict,
although he be imprisoned in the state
penitentiary as a matter of convenience.
It follows, from what has been said,
that the civil courts have no more
right to impede or hamper the governor in discharging his duty of suppressing insurrection, than the governor has to hamper the courts in
their administration of justice in times

and places of civil peace. Both, when
so acting, act under the constitution.
The executive and the judiciary are
co-ordinate

and

independent

depart-

ments, and neither is above the other.
It is true that the governor has the
power to say whether the time or the
place is one of peace or insurrection,
and no dourt can question his finding.
It is also true that unless the governor
is in the exercise of a constitutional
duty, he is the same as any other citizen and amenable to the process of the
least court in the state.
And this
brings us to the question of procedure
in cases of habeas corpus, which are
often brought in behalf of rioters imprisoned under executive authority.
Usually the military operations have
been promptly successful to an extent
that has permitted a civil court to sit
in quiet somewhere in or near the
insurrectionary zone. Prompt application is there made on behalf of the
prisoner, alleging that he is illegally
restrained of his liberty.
At various
times during the last century, a few
courts failed to grasp the principles
involved, held that the executive department had no right to operate otherwise than under civil procedure, and
undertook to discharge the prisoner.
Wherever the executive department
stood its ground, the court's theory
was soon reduced to an absurdity. The
only officers who could enforce the
court's order were the sheriff and his
deputies, bailiff, coroner, etc., who had
already proved powerless to deal with
the local disturbances and who could
not possibly, unaided, take away the
prisoner from the military commander
and his soldiers. The only higher authority was the governor, and his was
the very authority by which the prisoner was held. If the sheriff tried to
organize a posse comitatus to give battle to the troops, he must draw his
force from the unorganized militia of
the state, all able-bodied male residents between the ages of 18 and 45,
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whose commander-in-chief is the governor, and whose paramount allegiance
is to him. The governor in a courteous communication would point out to
the court its fundamental error, and
that he could not, consistent with his
oath of office release the prisoner and
thus permit him to help keep alive the
insurrection which the governor was
so anxiously engaged in suppressing.
This very transaction took place in
Ex parte Moore, 64 N. C. 802, in disturbances created by the original Ku
Klux Klan. The Supreme Court of
that state soon afterward modified its
views in keeping with the logic of correct principles.
If a court is sitting and application
for the writ is made, not showing
clearly on its face that the prisoner is
held by proper authority, the court
should ordinarily grant the writ, to be
returnable in the usual way. The national guard commander should make
return, setting out very fully and in
courteous and respectful language the
basis and reasons for holding the petitioner. Forms for this are found in
the appendix to Davis on Military Law
and are easily adaptable to state practice. The commander should also, out
of respect for the court, produce the
prisoner, unless tactical considerations
seemed to forbid, in which case an
explanation should be included in the
return. The return showing that the
petitioner is held by the governor's
authority-in connection with the civil
disturbances, the court should, of
course, remand the prisoner. I am
told that during the Cripple Creek insurrection, a district judge, supposed
to be in* sympathy with the rioters,
undertook to discharge a military
prisoner, in the face of a proper return such as above indicated; and that
the Adjutant General, Sherman Bell,
was compelled to rise in open court
and notify the judge that he could not
and would not obey the order. If so,
he did exactly right, as there is no

RECORD

reason why the executive should back
down in the face of judicial usurpation, any more than that the judiciary
should tamely submit to executive
usurpation where no authority exists.
These delicate situations show that
bad conflicts may lurk close to the
surface; and the only way to avoid
them, among honest men, is for everyone to understand the correct principles which apply.
Time will not permit dealing with,
or even suggesting, many problems
that may arise out of Martial Rule;
but there is one of particular importance, namely, the correct theory of
liability against the governor and
those in military service during the
insurrection.
Many a mob leader
comes into court, after peace is restored, loudly complaining that his
sacred rights under the constitution
have been infringed by restraining
him. At all other times he abhors
that document. Cases may conceivably arise, of course, where the executives should be held liable; and the
ground for their liability is simply a
wanton abuse of power. In Moyer v.
Peabody, the plaintiff, president of the
Western Federation of Miners, had
been held by the military for two and
a half months during which the insurrection was flagrant. After it was
over, and Gov. Peabody's term of office had expired, Moyer sued him, his
Adjutant General Bell and Bulkley
Wells, a captain of militia, for damages for that imprisonment, taking the
position that it was wholly illegal in
any event. Judge Lewis disposed of
that contention (148 Fed. 870) upon
the grounds expressed by the state
supreme court in re Moyer in 35 Colo.,
and said:
"It would seem to be in keeping
with principle to hold the defendants
responsible by civil action for a
wanton abuse of power. In Luther
v. Borden it is said: 'No more force
... can be used than is necessary to
accomplish the object, and if the

THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD
power is exercised for purposes of
oppression, or any injury wilfully
done to person or property, the party
by whom, or by whose order, it is
committed would undoubtedly be answerable'

.

.

.

(Judge

Lewis

con-

tinues: )
Reasonable inquiry and
care on their part, under the circumstances as they then exist, ought to
relieve them from civil responsibilt
ity."
The complaint not showing any
wanton abuse of power, he sustained
a demurrer to it. Moyer carried the
case to the Supreme Court where Mr.
Justice Holmes delivered the unanimous opinion. After sustaining the
authority of the state officials in every
particular he said:
"No doubt there are cases where
the expert on the spot may be called
upon to justify his conduct later in
court, notwithstanding the fact that
he had sole command at the time
and acted to the best of his knowledge. That is the position of a captain of a ship. But, even in that
case, great weight is given to his
determination, and the matter is to
be judged on the facts as they appeared then, and not merely in the
light of the event. When it comes
to the decision by the head of the
state upon a matter involving its
life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems
the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution
of executive process for judicial
process".
In his argument for the defendant
in Luther v. Borden, Webster very
clearly set forth the discretionary nature of the commander's martial law
authority in the following words:
"I shall only draw attention to the
subject of Martial Law, and in respect to that, instead of going back
to Martial Law as it existed in England at the time the charter of
Rhode Island was granted, I shall
merely observe that Martial Law
confers power of arrest, of summary
trial, and prompt execution, and that
when it has been proclaimed the
land becomes a camp, and the law
of the camp is the law of the land.
Mr. Justice Story defines martial
law to be the law of war, a resort

to military authority in cases where
the civil law is not sufficient; and
it confers summary power, not to
be used arbitrarily or for the gratification of personal feelings of hatred
or revenge, but for the preservation
of order and public peace. The officer clothed with it is to judge of
the degree of force that the necessity of the case may demand, and
there is no limit to this, except such
as is to be found in the nature and
character of the exigency".
Had Mr. Webster added that, on the
one hand, when used calmly, reasonably, and with the evident desire to
serve the public welfare, though great
errors of judgment may be made, much
latitude is allowed the commander in
the exercise of his authority; and on
the other hand, if an intent to use
power for personal ends, or in an oppressive manner be manifested, he is
liable to be held to account, both militarily and civilly, the outline would
be complete. The rule is that when
martial law exists, either by proclamation or otherwise, the commanding officer must use his discretion, and is
expected to come as reasonably near
to the line of justice and fair dealing
as the circumstances,' as they appear
at the time, and the information he
has or may easily obtain will permit.
The question naturally arises in any
mind as to possibilities of abuse of
power; but as stated in the Moyercase, arguments based on such possibilities are of the weakest variety; because abuse of power is always possible in any department of government. The political remedy for abuse
of power is by impeachment under
Article XIII. Under Article IV, Section 4, of the Federal Constitution the
national government guarantees to
every state a republican form of government. A permanent status of martial rule would not be republican in
form, and, if attempted, the federal
government would promptly overthrow
it. Cases of governors' exceeding their
authority are very rare, one of the few
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instances arising in West Virginia in
1921.
There the Supreme Court of
Appeals, in a series of exceedingly
well-considered cases, had upheld the
executive department in putting an
end to reigns of terror in the coal districts. A later governor, evidently
conceiving that he could enjoy the efficacy of Martial Rule, without the
expense of maintaining troops, declared Martial Law and sent only his
Adjutant General to the district to
take command of the activities of the
sheriff, his deputies and the posse
comitatus. The same judge who had
written most of the previous opinions
denied, in a clear and unanswerable
exposition of the law, the authority in
any executive to inaugurate a military
jurisdiction when he can get along
without the military itself. (88 W. Va.
713; 108 S. E. 428; 24 A.L.R. 1178).
It is worth noticing that state police
are not state troops, but are civil
police, and no martial law measures
can be predicated upon their use alone,
although under martial rule they can
be used by, and may cooperate with
the military. Martial Law is an extreme measure, and efficient local
peace officers, aided by a permanent
state police, are desirable to make the
necessities for Martial Rule as infrequent as possible.
These would be
more infrequent if the civil officers
would do their duty. As pointed out
by the, Chief Justice in the Milligan
case, the"local civil officers may even
be the allies of insurrection. More
often, they allow themselves to be
intimidated, and excuse their inaction
by claiming it is impolitic to enforce
the law or prosecute the rioters; or
they pretend to regard the disturbance
as a private quarrel in which they
should not "take sides"; meaning that
the mob is free to murder and loot to
the extent of its capacity. The victims
of its hostility must then defend themselves as best they can, and when they
do so, are often criticized by a large

section of the pulpit and press for carrying on a "private war".
The failure on the part of peace officers and prosecutors to do their duty
results in a denial to the citizen of
protection and redress under the civil
phases of the constitution; it amounts
to a usurpation by such local officers
of a discretion which is not even
lodged in the legislature but is forbidden to any department, namely, a
discretion to abandon the inhabitants,
property and industries of a given locality to the will and desires of a mob.
As they must be protected somehow,
it thus becomes necessary to send in
the troops, where they might not have
been needed if the local prosecutors
and peace officers had made a serious
attempt to carry out their duties in
the first instance; and the continual
failure of county and district officers
causes many persons to assume that
no authority is ever very effective except the military.
In conclusion, I think the most important points are:
1st. That the civil guaranties are
not suspended by the executive, but, in
theory and in fact, by the mob or insurrection that temporarily wipes out
constitutional protection.
2nd. That, in restoring the constitutional regime, the governor and his
officers use the armed forces of the
state in accordance with the customs
and usages of war, and any measures
they in good faith adopt are due
process of law.
3rd. That, when civil authority has
been restored, they can be held liable
civilly and politically, only for a
wanton or wilful abuse of power in
carrying out their functions.
It Was Catching
Nutz was arrested on a charge of
driving under the influence of liquor.
cand %alth%t mtr ft rtircmfeftdfalw.
-Denver Paper.

